













ABSTRACT: At the the Ad de Jonge Centre, 
University of Amsterdam, over a period of almost 
ten years there was experience in Red Team 
experiments of, among others, the Dutch critical 
infrastructure. The tests regularly started with the 
outcomes of the National Advisory Centre Vital 
Infrastructure (NAVI), to see if any residual threat 
had been overlooked. The project also 
encompassed a more methodological approach of 
how to deal with the unknown. 
This article starts with a tool of how to deal with the 
unknown. The tool is a specific Rumsfeld matrix 
that was developed in cooperation with the Dutch 
Intelligence and Security Institute of the Dutch 
                     
1   In 2005, Giliam de Valk published his PhD on the quality intelligence analyses have 
to meet. He is specialized in the methodology of security and intelligence analysis. 
He has worked at the University of Amsterdam, the University of Utrecht, and the 
Netherlands Defense Academy where he coordinated and lectured a minor on 
intelligence studies. At the moment he is an assistant professor at the Institute for 











































defense forces (DISI). The Ad de Jonge Centre 
used this tool to cope with the different types of 
unknowns. A focus will be on the so-called 
unknown-unknown – in which it is both unknown of 
how to retrieve data, as well as the data 
themselves.  
By using this framework, it will be evaluated of how 
the Centre came to a more methodological 
approach in dealing with residual threat. First, the 
Ad de Jonge Centre took over the already more 
established technique of Red Team experiments. 
Secondly, it enriched these experiments, by 
looking at the β aspects – in order not to miss a 
threat – of so-called Structured Analytic 
Techniques. Thirdly, it dealt with the issue of logic 
– reasoning – in the context of not missing threats. 
And finally – in an intelligence setting that is 
dominated by positivistic Empiricism – it turned to 
continental philosophy, to assess if this would lead 
to new insights in the dealing with the unknown. 
Eventually, the Ad de Jonge Centre developed its 
own approach in dealing with the unknown and 
residual threat. This article is meant to share this 
approach, and to inspire those working in the field 
of securing the critical infrastructure and working 
with the unknown. 
KEYWORDS: critical infrastructure, methodology, 
β, residual threat, Rumsfeld matrix, Blind Spot 
 
1. Introduction 
When the Ad de Jonge Centre of University of 
Amsterdam was asked to see if anything was 













































infrastructure, it started with a twofold question2. 
First, it looked at the outcomes of and 
assessments by the National Advisory Centre 
Vital Infrastructure (NAVI).3 
The Ad de Jonge Centre inquired if these 
assessments could be challenged, especially 
concerning the assessed level of security. This 
was, as such, a straightforward process. 
Secondly, it looked at the methodology of such 
a tasking. This last issue, on methodology, 
turned out to be more complicated one.  
This article will give an overview of the quest at 
the Ad de Jonge Centre to try to formulate a 
more methodological approach to test the 
security of the critical infrastructure. For a large 
part the focus is on the issue of residual threat. 
It turned out that some techniques were 
available, as the Red Team experiment, but a 
more methodological approach of the issue was 
almost completely absent. Over the years, it 
was tried at the Ad de Jonge Centre to get a 
better insight concerning a possible 
methodological underpinning of dealing with the 
unknown and the residual threat. 
 
 
                     
2 In 2017, the Ad de Jonge Centre moved to Leiden University and integrated in the 
Institute for Security and Global Affairs. It transformed into the intelligence working 
group of the ISGA that, together with other institutions in Europe, wanted to aim at 
founding an own Continental School for Intelligence (CSI) in Europe. 
3 The NAVI - Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur - ceased to function in 2010, 
after it has made its assessments on the different critical infrastructures in the 
Netherlands. Advisors of the NAVI continued its activities in the Adviescentrum 
Bescherming Vitale Infrastructuur. 











































2. The unknown-unknown – positioning, tooling, and 
methodology 
Before focusing on the residual threat, it is first 
tried to place the residual threat in a bigger 
picture of unknowns. This section will result in 
the conclusion that residual threat can be 
formulated as an unknown-unknown, in which 
both the way to retrieve the information, and the 
data itself is unknown. To explain this in more 
in-depth, it is first turned to a statement from 
2002, of the former United States Secretary of 
State, Donald Rumsfeld. 
[T]here are known knowns; there are 
things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say 
we know there are some things we do not 
know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns – there are things we do not 
know we don't know. And if one looks 
throughout the history of our country and 
other free countries, it is the latter 
category that tend to be the difficult ones 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). 
2.1 Rumsfeld matrix 
Rumsfeld made his remarks in the context of 
the Iraq war and the absence of evidence of 
weapons of mass destruction. The emphasis on 
problems caused by unknowns were a starting 
point to arrange methods and data. Goldbach & 
De Valk transformed the quote of Rumsfeld into 
two axes of unknowns. On the x-axis, it is put 
whether the way of how to retrieve data is 
known or not [retrieval]. On the y-axis, it is put 













































[data].4 This leads to four combinations of 
retrieval [known/unknown] and data 
[known/unknown]. Each of those combination is 
a quadrant of the matrix. Rumsfeld did not refer 
to the unknown-known. From the perspective of 
logic, however, there is no reason to exclude 
this option If his statement is thus rearranged in 
a matrix, it results in the next composing 
elements: 














The main focus of the Ad de Jonge Centre was 
on the unknown-unknown – in which both the 
way to retrieve the information, and the data 
itself is unknown. Yet, testing the other 
quadrants also could result in leads of security 
aspects that were overlooked. As it was 
assumed that the NAVI had carried out its work 
well and processed many data with established 
techniques, the repetition of its work was not 
the primary focus. As the Ad de Jonge Centre 
focused on the unknown-unknown, it tried to 
                     
4 A research design with the Rumsfeld matrix is since 2013 part of the Minor 
Intelligence Studies, first at the University of Amsterdam (Ad de Jonge Centre) and, 











































further define – at a methodological level – the 
type of activity it had to carry out. 
2.2 Threat, β and Adversaries Modus Operandi 
A question the Ad de Jonge put itself was, if it 
had to focus on risks or on threats. A risk is 
here shortly defined as the change an incident 
might take place multiplied by the impact. Or 
more formally: risk is the quantitative 
multiplication of the probability of the 
occurrence of an event by its estimated impact. 
In this discipline, the probability is often 
estimated on a subjective basis – referred at as 
uncertainty (see Glendon, 2016). This approach 
implies that, for the risk mitigation, you try to 
reduce the number of incidents and the impact 
itself. To assess the risk, it is calculated on data 
available in the past and present. At the Ad de 
Jonge Centre this risk approach was assessed 
as inappropriate for its assignment for two 
reasons: 
(1) it would – to a large part – duplicate 
the work of the NAVI. 
(2) real innovations by humans cannot 
be assessed by a risk calculation. 
 
Especially for this second reason, the Centre 
decided to focus on threats only. A threat is 
here shortly defined as an undesirable event by 
an opponent that you do not want to take place. 
Or more formally: a threat is a too hard to 
handle causes of events that may result in 
harm. A threat is generally associated with 
malicious actors (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2006, 9). A threat does not 
necessarily cause actual harm. It is on the 













































Assurance Training and Education Center, 
consulted in 2013). Contrary to the risk 
approach, it could include to warn for new 
Adversaries Modus Operandi [AMO] that were 
never used by this opponent. If it was likely that 
an opponent could apply this AMO – although it 
had never used it before – the change it could 
happen was assessed as 1 [possible]. If not so, 
it was assessed as 0 [not possible]. A large part 
of the assignment at the Ad de Jonge Centre 
was dedicated to identify such new AMO’s. 
Such exercises were already carried out by 
many groups and were known under various 
names as Red Team/Red Cell exercises. In this 
article, Red Team will be used as an 
overarching term that both includes Strategic 
Red Teaming – including its assault scenarios, 
as applied by the military – and Red Cell 
exercises. Although such exercises can serve 
different purposes, such as creating awareness, 
or to develop Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP’s), the prime focus at the Ad de Jonge 
Centre was on a third – AMO’s and options that 
apparently were not identified by the NAVI (De 
Valk, 2012). Then, it was tried to define – from 
a methodological perspective – more precisely 
what these exercises exactly encompassed. 
Intelligence analysis aims at reducing the 
uncertainty regarding the courses of action of 
an opponent. The aim is to give timely warnings 
for these threats, so actions can be taken to 
avert a threat. Characteristic for opponents is 
that they will try to confuse and to mislead to 
deny information regarding their courses of 
action.  
The orientation on this type of threat has 
consequences for the so-called α and β, 











































which the primary focus is on to explain, to 
proof something. The α is the chance that you 
incorrectly conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between phenomena. The β is the 
chance that you do not discover a weak, but 
actual existing, relationship between 
phenomena. In traditional academic research, 
the emphasis is to reduce the value of the α – 
the chance that you incorrectly conclude that 
there is a significant relationship between 
phenomena. In intelligence research, however, 
the main emphasis is on not to miss a threat – 
the β – the chance that you do not discover a 
weak, but actual existing, relationship between 
phenomena (De Valk, 2005, 66-67).  
 In short: in intelligence research it is more 
critical to identify the threats and not to miss 
these (β orientated research), than that you in-
depth prove or explain that a threat will occur (α 
orientated research). This calls for a research 
design, the application of logic, methods and 
techniques, with respect to their β capabilities. 
As we defined risk as the change an incident 
might take place multiplied by the impact, a risk 
assessment is thus associated with reducing 
the α. The threat – an undesirable event by an 
opponent that you do not want to take place – is 
about not to miss, and therefore associated with 
the β. Furthermore, the Centre already decided 
it was only interested in the threat and the 
whether or not an opponent could carry out an 
attack with a certain AMO. As a result, the Ad 
de Jonge Centre defined the Red Teaming 
exercises it carried out for the critical 
infrastructure as follows: 
Red Teaming is an experiment to reduce the 
value of the β by identifying threats that belong 













































assess if that threat is possible or not (1 or 0). 
(De Valk, 2012). 
Especially in the first phase of dealing with 
residual threat of the critical infrastructure, this 
was the prime focus – together with trying to 
falsify the assumptions the NAVI made 
concerning the level of security and safety. 
Now, it is established how the Ad de Jonge 
carried out its assignments, it is turned to its 
prime focus – the unknown-unknown quadrant 
of the Rumsfeld matrix. 
3. The unknown-unknown quadrant 
In the unknown-unknown quadrant, both the 
technique to obtain information [retrieval] and 
the data are unknown. For the unknown-
unknown quadrant, the Ad de Jonge Centre 
could use Red Teaming. At the Centre, only 
one time a full elaborate Strategic Red Teaming 
was carried out. In all other cases it was a mix 
of challenging the assumptions of the current 
level of security (see, section on known-known 
quadrant), and looking for unidentified options 
and AMO’s by an opponent. In most cases, it 
had the resemblance of an upgraded Red Cell 
exercise.  
From the beginning on, the Centre tried to 
innovate the more classic Red Team and Red 
Cell approach. First, it was looked at the β 
aspect of so-called Structured Analytical 
Techniques (SAT’s). For this, it was assessed 
what aspect of a certain technique could 
contribute to unveil unidentified aspects 
concerning threats. In the section on the 
known-known, an example is given concerning 
Quadrant Crunching. Second, some of the 











































the upgraded Red Cell experiment more 
structure. For a series of experiments, different 
steps were worked through, to see if there were 
any anomalies discovered that could be a lead 
for further research. These steps included 
techniques as Quadrant Crunching, SWOT-
inventory, Ease x Impact matrix, CARVER + 
Shock (for an explanation of some of these 
techniques, see the heading ‘known-unknown 
quadrant’). 
What is important to note here, is that these 
techniques were not used to make an analysis 
of the case at hand. The techniques were only 
used to give structure to the experiment. They 
had shown to be productive in triggering 
elements and anomalies concerning the 
established level of security. These identified 
anomalies would then be the input for the actual 
Red Team exercise. Furthermore, the Red 
Team was explicitly instructed not to limit itself 
to these techniques, and it was encouraged to 
use whatever the team thought to be useful. In 
the second phase, the experiment could move 
into every direction, based upon anomalies 
found. In this phase, the real experiment into 
the unknown-unknown started. The approached 
showed to generate vital new unknowns in 
nearly all the experiments. Only one critical 
infrastructure showed to be extremely resilient – 
and this infrastructure had a very fragmented, 
network-like and multilayered structure.  
4. The known-known quadrant 
In the known-known quadrant, both the 
technique to retrieve the data and the data 
themselves are known. Besides the Red Team 
experiments of the unknown-unknown 













































falsify the assumptions the NAVI made 
concerning the level of security and safety of 
the infrastructure. Concerning the Rumsfeld 
matrix, we now deal with the known-known 
quadrant, as the NAVI based its assumptions 
on the level of security after elaborate research. 
In its research both established methods were 
used and data processed, or – in the system of 
the Rumsfeld matrix, both the method of 
retrieval was known, as the data itself.  
To challenge the assumptions of the NAVI, the 
Centre applied Structured Analytic Techniques 
(SAT’s) with a high β potential (see, previous 
section on the unknown-unknown quadrant). 
One of those techniques was Quadrant 
Crunching. To use the technique this way, it 
had to be simplified a bit – as originally it was 
used if only a few data are known, to obtain a 
wide array of hypotheses (Heuer, 2014). For 
one of the infrastructures, the NAVI had 
established that it was resilient against attacks, 
and all the AA-locations were protected at a 
reasonable level. After Quadrant Crunching, it 
turned out that this infrastructure was only 
protected as an object of attack. It was not 
tested as a means to attack other 
infrastructures. Furthermore, the implicitly 
assumed AMO by the NAVI, to blow this 
structure up, turned out not to be the most 
effective one, if it was used as a means. The 
Red Team experiment resulted in an AMO that 
was easy to carry out. Now, a new inventory 
was made of these additional AA-locations to 
be protected. And in practice, additional 
measures were implemented (for reasons of 
security, no details can be disclosed).  
A second example concerned an object that 











































perimeter of another object that had – as a part 
of its security – a professional counter 
observation team. Any hostile activities – so the 
original assumption was – would be noticed by 
the professional counter observation team. To 
test this, the Ad de Jonge Centre composed a 
counter counter observation (CCO) team of a 
few students, supplemented by one football 
hooligan. The hooligan was added to the team 
to include street-wise instinct – and this 
required some deconfliction with the authorities. 
This CCO team was only given three very 
simple directions: 1] work from the outside 
inwards; 2] make a line of sight map; and, 3] 
reflect on you timing. With these simple 
directions the CCO team managed not only to 
identify the different rings of the counter 
observation, but it could also identify all the 
members of the counter observation team – 
including making close range pictures for 
identification. None of the members of the CCO 
team was at any time noticed by the 
professional counter observation team. The 
object – that initially thought to be save as it 
was within the perimeter of the counter 
observation team – from then on started to rely 
on its own (new) measures. 
5. The known-unknown quadrant 
In the known-unknown quadrant, the technique 
of retrieval is known, but the data itself is still 
unknown. The known-unknown quadrant was 
only used in later years of the Red Team 
exercises, and then mainly for new leads. In 
those instances, the Centre made an inventory 
of the techniques that were likely to be used in 
this quadrant. The Centre used this quadrant 
also when it was asked to Red Team the 













































threats and scenario’s that were overlooked in 
the original plans. 
An example is given of how the protection of a 
critical infrastructure can be split up in sub-
issues. For reasons of anonymity and security, 
it will be explained for a critical infrastructure 
that was never investigated by the Ad de Jonge 
Centre – the electricity network, or national 
power grid. The protection of the electricity 
network can easily be split up in three sub-
issues.  
First, there is the issue of possible perpetrators. 
In the case of the electricity network, a wide 
variety of groupings can pose threats. For many 
years, in the Netherlands, to exercise and to 
shoot with airguns at the spacers that keep the 
power lines – in the sections between the 
power pylons – apart from each other, was a 
kind of national sport that bothered electricity 
companies a lot. Furthermore, some decades 
ago, protestors – under the name of Front of 
Resistance Gyro Gearloose and the Little 
Helpers – sabotaged power lines that were 
connected to Dutch nuclear energy power 
plants (BVD, 1981, 33). And, it can be a target 
of terroristic activities. There are many possible 
perpetrators. How do you then select the most 
dangerous ones from the different categories 
mentioned? A method could be, for example, 
SLEIPNIR,5 to rank the groups in terms of their 
                     
5 SLEIPNIR is “an analytical technique developed to rank order organized groups of 
criminals in terms of their relative capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities. The 
rank ordered lists of groups are components of strategic intelligence assessments 
used to recommend intelligence and enforcement priorities”. To cope with 
organized crime, for example, attributes are selected as (in rank): 1 corruption; 2 
violence; 3 infiltration; 4 expertise; 5 sophistication; 6 subversion; 7 strategy; 8 
discipline; 9 insulation; 10 intelligence use; 11 multiple enterprises; 12 mobility; 13 











































relative capabilities, limitations and 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, one could assess 
for each group the weak and strong points, and 
the opportunities and weaknesses, with a 
SWOT-inventory. Finally, as the perpetrators 
can choose between multiple targets, a 
CARVER + Shock analysis6 could be carried 
out.  
Secondly, in order to protect the AA-locations 
that are most crucial and critical for the 
infrastructure, one will compose rings of 
barriers – physically and through security 
personnel – around these locations. 
Perpetrators can use different AMO’s to enter. 
Then, a technique will be selected to calculate 
the time needed to take the barriers for the 
different AMO’s. A Quantitative Intrusion Path 
Analysis7 could be used to calculate the delay 
                                            
other organized crime groups; 19 links to criminal extremist groups. For terrorism, a 
different attribute set is made (Strang, S.J., 1-5). 
6 CARVER + Shock is an acronym for criticality (measure of impact of an attack), 
accessibility (ability to physically access and egress from target), recuperability 
(ability of system to recover from an attack), vulnerability (ease of accomplishing 
attack), effect (amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss of 
production) and recognizability (ease of identifying target) + shock (the combined 
health, economic, and psychological impacts of an attack). It is a prioritization tool, 
a system of target acquisition, to rank potential targets according to a scale. By 
identifying and ranking the potential targets, attack resources can be efficiently 
used. It assesses the vulnerabilities within a system, industry, or infrastructure. 
Originally developed for US special forces, it is now also applied by, among others, 




7 The Quantitative Intrusion Path Analysis is a method that is known under different 
synonyms – with many different variants – often referring to the name of the 
specific software that is used to carry it out. It is designed not only to weigh 
physical security measures, but also the human factor. Thus, it could be measured 













































at the security rings opponents have to pass. 
Finally – as it is likely that additional measures 
are needed – INFOSEC and OPSEC analyses 
can be carried out based upon the previous 
findings. In the Red Team exercises, INFOSEC 
and OPSEC was a returning point of attention. 
Sometimes, technical personnel – crucial for 
the maintenance of the infrastructure – 
complained on social media about their 
managers. In other cases, the target 
organization had their INFOSEC intact, but 
others, like local municipalities and provinces, 
published sensitive material on their sites that 
could be used to plan a terrorist attack. 
Thirdly, to keep the external communication 
intact – vital in cases of, for example, a terrorist 
attack – a Fault Tree Analysis8 is a logic option. 
It means that for the second question – to 
protect the AA-locations – a different 
techniques is used than for the third question – 
to keep its external communication intact. The 
three sub-issues and the techniques that are 
likely to be used are presented in the next table. 
                                            
infrastructure. It measures the delay by physical barriers, and calculates issues as 
recognition, warning and reaction time (for a full system case study, see, for 
example: Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology 
Working Group (2009), Section D). It is also worked out in several variations for 
cyber. 
8   In 1962, H.A. Watson of Bell Telephone Laboratories developed the Fault Tree 
Analysis – also referred at as Event Tree Analysis – for the US Air Force 
(Minutemean). It is a logic diagram to relate conditions that precede faults and 
undesired events. At the top of the schedule, the undesired event – end state – is 
placed. It can be applied in both a qualitative and quantitative way (Martensen, et 











































Table 2: The known-unknown quadrant & a 
quick scan of techniques: three sub-issues in 





CARVER & Shock 
To keep the 






To keep the 
communication intact 
in case of an 
emergency 
Fault Tree Analysis 
 
Such a quick scan by the Centre could lead to 
outcomes that were not identified in the original 
plans. This was especially the case if the plans 
were based on experiences in the past, and not 
on a thorough analysis.   
6. The unknown-known quadrant 
In the unknown-known quadrant, the technique 
or algorithm to obtain information [retrieval] is 
unknown, but the data as such are present. 
This quadrant was never used in any of the Red 
Team exercises by the Ad de Jonge Centre. 
The simple reason was a lack of resources. 













































correlations that otherwise would remain 
unidentified. Working this way with AMO’s can 
lead to new insights. In the Netherlands, for 
example, large numbers of copper cables were 
stolen from the railway company. After 
additional measures, the theft of copper moved 
to the public space (art). After additional 
measures here, a waterbed mechanism 
developed. This mechanism was discovered by 
the Dutch Sosecure company that had initiated 
a data base for AMO’s (Plas, 2018). The 
unknown-known quadrant can eventually lead 
to a new sub-branch of Red Team exercises 
that is hardly made use of yet. It eventually 
could result in elaborate scenarios of how to 
counter these identified threats. This scenario 
building does not need to be carried out by the 
Red Team itself, but it could also be produced 
by the organization itself. 
7. Reflecting on the assignments 
When in 2017 the Ad de Jonge Centre moved 
from the University of Amsterdam, to Leiden 
University – where it integrated in the Institute 
for Security and Global Affairs – it reflected on 
the past decade of dealing with the unknown. 
For its Red Team experiments, the Centre 
applied known Red Team approaches, had 
made use of its Rumsfeld matrix, enriched it 
with the β aspects of SAT’s, and had 
challenged the assumptions of the assessed 
security level.  
It felt the need to evaluate its past on an even 
more abstract methodological level. First, it 
looked at how the different quadrants of the 
Rumsfeld matrix could contribute to test an 
already developed security plan. Secondly, it 











































contribute to reduce the β. Thirdly, it looked at 
the philosophical traditions in which security 
and intelligence had developed. 
7.1 Residual threat and the quadrants of the 
Rumsfeld matrix 
In the beginning, the Ad de Jonge Centre 
focused on the unknown-unknown quadrant – 
in which both the way of retrieval, and the data 
themselves are unknown. It turned to more 
established Red Team approaches, and finally 
developed an own – upgraded – Red Cell 
experiment that fitted the need of testing the 
assessments by the NAVI. But to what extent 
could the incorporation of the other quadrants 
of the Rumsfeld matrix also contribute to reduce 
the value of the β – the reduce the threat level 
as assessed by the NAVI? Now, a reflection is 
presented, focusing on the potential of a certain 
quadrant to minimize the value of the β – in 
order not to overlook a threat. 
First, there is the known-known quadrant – in 
which both the method of retrieval and the data 
themselves are known. This quadrant showed 
to be fruitful in challenging assumptions 
concerning the level of security, as assessed by 
the NAVI. Especially a simplified version of 
Quadrant Crunching showed to be simple, fast 
and very effective in challenging assumptions. 
After additional research, it led to convincing 
results and practical measures were taken by 
the responsible authorities. 
Secondly, there is the known-unknown 
quadrant – in which the method of retrieval is 
known, but the data themselves are unknown. 
This quadrant showed to have a potential to 













































effective methods of analysis were used. 
Especially if the main issue was split up in sub-
questions, the known-unknown quadrant 
resulted in SAT’s likely to be used to make an 
analysis of the problem. This quadrant also 
showed to have potential for securing major 
events. Often, the security of such events is 
protected based on scenarios of the past. The 
methodic approach of the known-unknown 
quadrant had then a large potential of yielding 
additional insights. 
Thirdly, there is the unknown-known quadrant – 
in which the method of retrieval is unknown, but 
the data themselves are known. The Ad de 
Jonge Centre itself had no experience with this 
quadrant. However, the private 
Sosecure/Kenniscentrum made and inventory 
of AMO’s and discovered cross-sectorial crime. 
The preliminary findings here tend to indicate 
that it will uncover AMO’s and trends that 
otherwise will stay unnoticed in the more 
traditional way of minimizing residual threat. 
To summarize: in the case of future Red Team 
experiments, elements could be included of the 
other three quadrants, besides the unknown-
unknown. Quick checks could produce 
anomalies for further experimenting. But for 
testing the unknown-known quadrant, it would 
require databanks as developed by 
Sosecure/Kenniscentrum.  
7.2 Logic: three types of reasoning 
In evaluating the Red Team experiments of the 
Ad de Jonge Centre, it was also assessed how 
logic had contributed to reduce the value of the 
β – to reduce the threat. This was done for the 











































matrix. It turned out to be a challenging 
evaluation, as the theory for reasoning was only 
developed in the context of reducing the value 
of the α – but not of the β. The findings 
presented here are therefore still preliminary 
and partly unmatured.  
It is assumed for reasons of robustness that all 
different classes of reasoning have to be used 
to minimize the value of the β as much as 
possible. In research, robustness refers to 
applying several methods and techniques in an 
analysis. The more such independent tests are 
survived, the more plausible the conclusion will 
be. Consequently, the finding does not depend 
on the analytical method used. To apply many 
methods to the same set of data, the margin of 
error is reduced (De Valk, 2005, 67-68). And it 
is assumed here that it is not only reduced by 
applying more methods, but also by applying 
different classes of reasoning. These classes of 
reasoning are deduction, induction, and the 
inference to the best explanation (IBE or 
abduction). 
A short description is presented on the classes 
of reasoning. First, there is deductive reasoning 
in which you argue from the general to the 
specific. An argumentation is deductive, 
meaning that if the premises are correct, the 
conclusion therefore will also be correct. 
Secondly, there is inductive reasoning in which 
a general rule is made based upon a number of 
specific observations or experiments. If the 
premises are true, the conclusion is likely to be 
true. Inductive reasoning is probabilistic, the 
premises do not make the conclusion absolute. 
Thirdly, there is the inference to the best 
explanation (IBE), or abductive reasoning, in 













































likeliness. It is assumed that the most likely 
conclusion is the correct one (Martensen, 1987, 
24-27. Grabo, 2002, 42-43). It is reasoning 
through successive approximation.  
As formulated in the above, the reasoning is 
developed in the context of reducing the value 
of the Such a quick scan by the Centre could 
lead to outcomes that were not identified in the 
original plans. This was especially the case if 
the plans were based on experiences in the 
past, and not on a thorough analysis.   
6. The unknown-known quadrant 
In the unknown-known quadrant, the technique 
or algorithm to obtain information [retrieval] is 
unknown, but the data as such are present. 
This quadrant was never used in any of the Red 
Team exercises by the Ad de Jonge Centre. 
The simple reason was a lack of resources. 
However, it could be fruitful to uncover 
correlations that otherwise would remain 
unidentified. Working this way with AMO’s can 
lead to new insights. In the Netherlands, for 
example, large numbers of copper cables were 
stolen from the railway company. After 
additional measures, the theft of copper moved 
to the public space (art). After additional 
measures here, a waterbed mechanism 
developed. This mechanism was discovered by 
the Dutch Sosecure company that had initiated 
a data base for AMO’s (Plas, 2018). The 
unknown-known quadrant can eventually lead 
to a new sub-branch of Red Team exercises 
that is hardly made use of yet. It eventually 
could result in elaborate scenarios of how to 
counter these identified threats. This scenario 
building does not need to be carried out by the 











































by the organization itself. α: on how to reach 
your conclusions and on the absoluteness of 
your claim. β research, however, is about to 
avoid missing relationships. In such a context, 
reasoning – deductive, inductive, or via 
inference to the best explanation (IBE) – need 
to be reformulated, and to be calibrated from an 
α approach to a β approach. Then it is not 
about to proof or to explain, but about to avoid 
to miss a relationship. Not only in general 
publications on methodology, but also in 
intelligence handbooks, reasoning is presented 
and explained in the context of reducing the α, 
and not of the β (De Groot, 1981, 38, 76-82, 38. 
Grabo, 2002, 42-44; Voulon, 2010, 24-27).  
To what extent can reasoning - deduction, 
induction, and IBE – contribute to avoid to miss 
relevant relationships – threats? During the Red 
Team experiments, some insights were 
obtained. Without claiming definitive 
conclusions, the experiments at the Centre 
indicated some strong and weak points of these 
three ways of reasoning (De Valk, 2018, 120-
122). 
Table 3: Reasoning and to reduce the value of 
the β 
Reasoning  Strength Weakness 








Weak in making 
an inventory of a 
deviation of the 
general pattern. 





















































Induction  Maps 
innovations, as 
new AMO’s.  
Aims at the 
unique [e.g. by 
Verstehen]. 
Slow for making 
an inventory of 
possible threats.  
Maps only a small 



















patterns with a 
prognostic 
value [trends]. 
Often no causality. 
A minority of the 
correlations found 
will be of 







[only for trends], 
because the data 
needs to be 














































As a result of these preliminary findings, it is 
recommended to include all types of reasoning 
in the Rumsfeld matrix when developing an 
overall security plan. Although not actively 
tested during the assignments, it looks also 
promising to make use of all three types of 
reasoning in Red Team experiments. This 
would imply also quick checks for the other 
quadrants – as described in the previous 
paragraph – as the unknown-unknown quadrant 
is by its nature inductive.  
7.3 Residual threat: Empiricism and The Idea 
In what tradition has the thinking on security 
and intelligence evolved? If we look at the 
literature, it is dominated by Anglo Saxion 
publications. In turn, reflecting on security and 
intelligence is highly influenced by Empiricism. 
In this tradition, there is a focus on the object 
and on to measure the object. How could this 
object be best measured and what are the 
pitfalls in the measurement? In our field, an 
important emphasis is put on the concepts of 
denial and deception – the opponent who tries 
to deceive us in making an assessment. To 
cope with denial and deception, security 
services have developed dogma’s as to 
mobilize extra sources and other means of 
investigation (De Valk, 2005, 351). Attention is 
also paid to biases by ourselves. In Heuer’s 
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, for 
example, it is put that the analytic traps caught 
the intelligence expert as much as anybody. 
The ‘pitfalls the human mental process sets for 
analysts cannot be eliminated; they are part of 
us. What can be done is to train people how to 
look for and recognize these mental obstacles, 
and how to develop procedures designed to 













































found in options as working with SAT’s, as for 
example formulated by Heuer and Pherson 
(Heuer, 2014).  
Could we miss something as a result of this 
dominance of Empiricism? Another tradition is 
the continental philosophy or The Idea. 
Concepts that have been developed here, could 
contribute to additional insights to reduce the 
value of the β. One of these concepts is The 
Blind Spot. When we view reality, our mind – 
ourselves – is always included in our viewing of 
it. Since we are part of the universe, whatever 
we view will always include us as a distortion. 
This is a blind spot we cannot account for.  
[t]he observed difference is not simply 
"subjective," due to the fact that the same 
object which exists "out there" is seen 
from two different stations, or points of 
view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have 
put it, subject and object are inherently 
"mediated," so that an "epistemological" 
shift in the subject's point of view always 
reflects an "ontological" shift in the object 
itself. Or, to put it in Lacanese, the 
subject's gaze is always-already inscribed 
into the perceived object itself, in the guise 
of its "blind spot," that which is "in the 
object more than object itself," the point 
from which the object itself returns the 
gaze (Zizek, consulted in 2018). 
The potential of this approach is that the focus 
is not on the object of research – including in 
relation to pitfalls in the analyst’s mental 
process – but on the distortion of what we view 
as we are part of the world we are researching. 
Eliminating residual threat would – according to 











































issue. Also, it points at the need of different 
perspectives – to cope with at least a part of our 
own Blind Spot – in order to reduce the value of 
the β.  
The concept of the Blind Spot points at the 
importance of team composition and the 
guidance of people of different backgrounds 
that use different ways of working. It is needed 
to show how each could contribute to the total 
by its own specific quality. Concerning the 
concept of the Blind Spot, there is a difference 
in emphasis compared to Red Team 
handbooks in the way it calls attention for the 
group composition and mental pitfalls 
(Command Red Team, 2016). During the most 
successful Red Team exercises at the Centre, 
the teams were composed of different 
backgrounds and personalities. This also called 
for some extra guidance to keep the team 
together. Also to include more street wise 
people into the team had showed to be of great 
value – as, for example, concerning the earlier 
mentioned football hooligan.  
Maybe, this diversity also applies to security 
and intelligence agencies. The issue of the 
Blind Spot may point at problems when the 
selection is biased by the recruitment of 
employees with an academic level, from a 
middle class and autochthonous background. It 
will lead to limitations in perspectives. To recruit 
from minority groups – or sailors who have 
seen the darker side of the harbors around the 
world – could be of an added value for the 
services. Concerning the Dutch General 
Intelligence and Security Service, a bias was 
noticed in the recruitment of new personnel: 
‘well-educated, ambitious, liberal ladies in their 













































their off-spring to school with their box bikes’ 
(NRC, 2018). It may lead to adjustments in both 
the assessments during the recruitment and the 
methods of screening by services. 
8. Final observations: A Game of Perspectives 
When the Ad de Jonge Centre tried to assess 
its position to test the assessment of the NAVI, 
it started with a methodological definition 
concerning its Red Team activities. It defined 
Red Teaming as an experiment to reduce the 
value of the β by identifying threats that belong 
to the category of the unknown-unknown to 
assess if that threat is possible or not (1 or 0). 
In the following years, it developed its own 
approach to cope with the residual threat, that 
eventually evolved into A Game of 
Perspectives.  
A Game of Perspectives is composed of 
different elements. First, it explores all the four 
quadrants of the Rumsfeld matrix. There is a 
main emphasis on the unknown-unknown 
quadrant. But also the assumptions concerning 
the level of security are challenged – the 
known-known quadrant. For this, it is looked at 
the β aspects of the SAT’s. A quick stress test 
will be carried out on the methods used in the 
known-unknown quadrant. There is the 
possibility to include the unknown-known 
quadrant as well, if relevant databanks are 
available. Secondly, all three types of reasoning 
are included in the exercise. Finally, the 
concept of the Blind Spot indicates to focus on 
different perspectives, not only in assessing the 
opponent, but also within our own community in 
order to minimize our own blind spot as least a 











































However, this evaluation and rethinking on its 
activities is a snapshot in time of work in 
progress. This also applies to A Game of 
Perspectives. It is the conviction of the author, 
however, that to develop tools like the Rumsfeld 
matrix, and to obtain a better methodological 
understanding, will serve our activities of 
minimizing the value of the β. The ultimate goal 
is to keep the value of the β as low as possible. 
We hope this evaluation will lead to inspiration 
and a more methodological oriented reflection 
on the unknown and residual threat. 
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